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MERGERS UNDER THE REAGAN JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT: REDEFINING SECTION 7
OF THE CLAYTON ACT
INTRODUCTION

In June of 1982, the Department of Justice issued its long-awaited
revised merger guidelines.' Like the prior version, 2 these guidelines detail Department enforcement procedures regarding Section 7 of the
Clayton Act3 and Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 4 The express purpose
of the guidelines is to advise the Justice Department's Antitrust Division staff in deciding whether particular mergers violate the Clayton or
Sherman Acts, and to assist the business community in complying with
these Acts.' More importantly, however, the guidelines embody the departmental view which regards mergers "as an important and extremely valuable capital market phenomenon, . . . to be in general
facilitated." 6 Accordingly, the guidelines state the Justice Department's policy which is particularly important given the Department's
vital role in molding merger law.
Unlike other areas of antitrust, merger law rarely involves private
litigants.7 Corporations generally merge' of their own volition and will
1.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES-1982, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as GUIDELINES].

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES-1968, reprintedin I TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 4510 (Aug. 9, 1982). The Justice Department's first attempt at providing some
guidance came in 1955 when the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws identified more than 50 factors to be considered in analyzing mergers. The first
merger guidelines were published in 1968 under then Assistant Attorney General Donald
Turner, and constitute the most recent version of the current guidelines.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). Mergers subject to Section 7 of the Clayton Act are prohibited "where
in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country,
the effect is such an acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition ...." As a
practical matter, the merger guidelines, and, therefore, this note, deal almost exclusively with
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Most mergers do not result in the formation of a monopoly
and hence do not violate Section 1of the Sherman Act. Virtually all mergers, however, must
pass muster under the "substantially lessen competition" test of the Clayton Act.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Mergers subject to Section Iof the Sherman Act are prohibited if they
constitute a "contract, combination.., or conspiracy in restraint of trade."
GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 28,494.
Remarks of William F. Baxter, 'Former Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, at the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Section of Antitrust Law of the
American Bar Association (August 9-11, 1982), reprinted in 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 287, 288
(1982). In December of 1983, Mr. Baxter resigned as Assistant Attorney General of the
Antitrust Division. He was replaced by Mr. J. Paul McGrath.
Areeda, Justice'sMerger Guidelines: The General Theory, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 303, 304 (1983).
Corporate combinations can be achieved through both volitional and hostile methods. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and hence the guidelines would apply to all of the methods. The
volitional methods include the statutory merger and the purchase of assets. The statutory
merger is generally accomplished with the approval of both corporations' boards of directors
and shareholders. Usually, one corporation, the constituent corporation, is merged into the
second corporation, which then becomes the survivor. The constituent corporation's stock is
converted into stock or obligations of the surviving corporation, or into cash or other prop-
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bring an antitrust action only in the rare instance of a hostile takeover.9
Mergers may cause individual employees, suppliers, and dealers to lose
their jobs because their efforts become redundant. Nevertheless, these
parties lack standing to sue because they are not deemed to suffer the
requisite antitrust damages.'" Individual customers, who pay the increased prices which generally result from decreased competition, most
likely lack the resources necessary to prove damages from illegal mergers." Without these individual plaintiffs to prime the judicial pump,
merger law necessarily relies upon Justice Department enforcement for
its continued development. The noninterventionist nature of the new
guidelines' 2 seriously jeopardizes this development.
Continued development in the law of mergers is significant for two
closely related reasons. First, merger activity has increased dramatically over the past several years.' 3 This new wave of mergers has con-

9.

10.
11.
12.

13.

erty. In the purchase of assets situation, the acquiring corporation's board approves a plan to
purchase all or substantially all of the selling corporation's assets. The deal must receive
approval of the selling corporation's shareholders but the acquiring corporation's shareholders generally need only approve the plan if it involves issuing additional stock. Finally, the
hostile combination is achieved through a tender offer. In this situation, the acquiring company offers to purchase target company shares directly from the target company's shareholders. This process circumvents the target corporation's management.
In 1982, for example, of the 2,346 mergers only 29 were hostile. In 1983, the total mergers
increased to 2,533, while hostile takeovers decreased to 11, Wall St. J., January 13, 1984, at
46, col. 4. In addition, there are a number of steps, short of an antitrust suit, employed by
target corporations to ward off takeover bids. One defense is the self-tender where a
threatened company offers to purchase its own shares at a price higher than the attacker's.
Another tactic creates new shares which dilute the voting power of existing shares. A third
method calls for amending corporate bylaws to stagger the terms of directors so that only a
few come up for election in any one year. In this way, even if the hostile corporations acquires a controlling interest it will take at least two years to translate this share control into
board control. Finally, some corporations merely reincorporate in a state more favorable to
current management.
2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 339 (1978).
Areeda, supra note 7, at 305.
Remarks of Baxter, supra note 6. The Justice Department's general policy supports mergers.
In addition, the guidelines technically support mergers by broadly defining the relevant
product and geographic markets, and thus minimizing the anticompetitive effects of any one
particular merger. See infra section of this note entitled Analysis of the 1982 Merger
Guidelines.
The importance of this development can hardly be overstated. As the following partially
reprinted table indicates, mergers have increased steadily between 1974 and 1980, with a
dramatic increase in 1981:
No. of
Year
Transactions % Change
1974
926
1975
981
+
6.0%
1976
1,145
+
17.0%
1977
1,209
+
5.6%
1978
1,452
+
20.0%
1979
1,564
+
7.7%
1980
1,583
+
1.2%
1981
2,313
+ 46.1%
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS Almanac & Index-1982, at 26 (1982). This trend has continued
in 1982 and 1983 with 2,346 and 2,533 mergers respectively, see discussion, supra note 9. In
addition there was a dramatic increase in merger dollar volume. The 2,313 mergers in 1981
accounted for $73 billion eclipsing the previous high of $48 billion set in 1968. MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS Almanac & Index-1982, at 4 (1982). Perhaps the most distressing trend, how-

19841

The 1982 Merger Guidelines

cerned members of the business and academic communities, as well as
Congress. 14 Second, is the relatively unsettled nature of merger law.
Merger analysis combines both legal and economic theory. 15 Economic theory, in particular, has undergone dramatic change in the past
decade.16 The guidelines are based heavily upon progressive economic
theories.' 7 The courts, on the other hand, are largely unfamiliar with
these economic theories and continue to rely on their own precedent.' 8
Furthermore, Congress has not substantively addressed the merger issue since it passed the Celler-Kefauver Act in 195019; therefore, the
statutory basis of merger law may be seriously outdated.
This note addresses the problems created by applying an uncertain
body of law to a contemporary and expanding economic issue. The
analysis of the new guidelines and their implications will follow a four
step process. The first section will analyze the legislative history of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, outlining congressional policies and concerns. Second, this note will then analyze the guidelines and compare
them to present case law. The third section will discuss the guideline's
empirical effects, focusing specifically upon their treatment by the
courts. The conclusion will present administrative and legislative solutions to the public policy issues raised by the new merger guidelines.
A LEGISLATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF SECTION SEVEN OF THE
CLAYTON ACT

Congress first ventured into the anitrust thicket in 1890 with the
passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 20 The general purpose of the
ever, is the increase in the size of individual mergers. In 1981, E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co. acquired Conoco Inc. for a record $6.8 billion. MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS Almanac &
Index-1982 at 8 (1982). 1982 saw the second largest merger when U.S. Steel Corp. acquired
Marathon Oil Co. for $6.2 billion. MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS Almanac & Index-1983 at 19

(1983). These record mergers pale by comparison to the two largest proposed mergers of
1984. In March, Standard Oil Company of California announced that it had agreed to buy
the Gulf Oil Corp. for $13.2 billion. R.J. Cole, Socal.4greesto Buy Gufin Record Deal-Price
is $13 Billion, N.Y. Times, March 6, 1984, at 1, col. 1. This followed Texaco's acquisition of
Getty Oil for $10 billion. R.J. Cole, Texaco Inc. Makes $10 Billion Offer to Buy Getty Oil,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1984, at 1, col. 3. These two mergers alone would total nearly one third
of the record dollar volume recorded in all of 1981.
14. See generally TIME, Feb. 6, 1984, at 46; N.Y. Times, March 7, 1984, at DI, col. 2.
15. Areeda, supra note 7, at 305.
16. Id at 312.
17. The guidelines rely heavily on the free market theories espoused by the so-called "Chicago
school of economics." The validity of these theories is beyond the scope of this note, but a
number of works have addressed the subject. See J. Ordover & R. Willig, The 1982 Department ofJustice Merger Guidelines: An Economic Assessment, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 535 (1983);
E.M. Fox, The New Merger Guidelines-a blueprintfor economic analysis, 27 ANTITRUST L.
BULL. 519 (1982). For a more general economic analysis, see D.F. Turner, Role ofthe "Market Concept" in Antitrust Law, 49 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 1145 (1981).
18. See, e.g., U.S. v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 65,656 (Oct. 5,
1983).
19. Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1982)).
20. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1-7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1982)).
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Act was to strictly regulate the formation and operation of monopolies
because of their perceived negative effect on competition. 2' Noncompetitive growth continued through mergers, however, and Congress
soon realized the need for additional legislation. 22 The greatest threat
to competition had become "not the growth of single large monopolistic companies in various industries, but the growth of industrial oligarchies in which power over an industry [was] divided among three or
four large concerns."2 3 Moreover because the Sherman Act could only
be used when a "monopoly [had] been attained or. . . the purpose to
monopolize had become clear,"2 4 it did little to alleviate the adverse
effects of market domination which existed long before a monopoly
capable of challenge had formed. In short, the Sherman Act offered
compensation, but not prevention. To bolster the preventative aspects,
in 1914 Congress passed the Clayton Act "to arrest the creation of
trusts, conspiracies, and monopolies in their incipiency."2 5
Unfortunately, the Clayton Act had its own shortcomings. The Act
proscribed a corporate acquisition of "the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital of two or more corporations engaged in
commerce, where the effect of such acquisition,. . . may be to substantially lessen competition ... "26 Shortly after its enactment, corporations began to violate the Act's spirit by acquiring the assets rather than
the capital stock of competing corporations. 27 Asset acquisitions did
not technically violate the Clayton Act, but it circumvented the policy
prohibiting excessive concentration.
This emasculation of the Clayton Act led to the enactment of the
Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950.28 The legislative history of the CellerKefauver Act provides an excellent illustration of the values and policies underlying Section 7 of the Clayton Act. These values and policies
transcend mere economic analysis.
Congress' foremost policy concern was that huge industries would
become economic states unto themselves.2 9 Such developments would
obviously have an impact on purely economic concerns such as prices
and competition. In addition, however, Congress foresaw this development as changing the very structure of American society. Congress
reasoned that the public would never allow such economic power to
rest in private hands."0 Thus, if mergers continued to expand corporate
21. Id
22. 95 CONG. REC. 11,493 (1949) (comments of former Representative Yates).
23. Id
24. Id
25. Id at 11,497. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C.

§ 18 (1982)).
27.
28.

Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1982)).
95 CONG. REc. 11493, 11497 (1949) (comments of former Representative Yates).
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

29.

95 CONG. REC. 11,943 (1949) (statement of former Representative Carrol).

30.

Id at 11,486 (statement of former Representative Celler.)

26.
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power, the public would eventually turn to the government for protection, resulting ultimately in a politically collectivist state.3 '
This scenario has both theoretical and historical underpinnings.
Marxist theory has based its "belief in the collapse of capitalism upon
[the] prediction that concentration of wealth and power would be carried so far in capitalist countries as to deprive most people of protection
from monopoly and to leave them without interest in the survival of
private enterprise. ' 32 From a historical standpoint, Congress examined
the experience of Great Britain, which at that time had no antitrust
laws. There socialism became a reality when corporations became so
big that there was "nothing left to do except for the Government to
take them over. . ."
Since such a result would be a political anathema in the United States, Congress sought to provide an alternative to
government ownership. Thus it passed legislation to help maintain a
free market economy.34
Congress' second policy concern in formulating Section 7 of the
Clayton Act was to protect small businesses. 35 Congress recognized
that small, independently owned businesses "of the kind that built up
our country, of the kind that made our country great.
.",36had a very
salutory effect on socioeconomic life in America.3 7 Protecting small
business also has the purely economic effect of enhancing competition.
But beyond this, Congress expressed a concern for the protection of the
entrepreneurial spirit which runs throughout the history of the American economic experience.
Finally, as a matter of policy, Congress noted that three distinct
types of mergers might pose antitrust problems. Specifically, Congress
applied section seven of the Clayton Act "to all types of mergers and
acquisitions, vertical and conglomerate, as well as horizontal, which
have the specified effects of substantially lessening competition...""
The guidelines contravene this policy by distinguishing only between
horizontal and non-horizontal mergers. 39 Moreover, the guidelines
particularly emphasize horizontal mergers because non-horizontal
mergers "are less likely than horizontal mergers to create competitive
problems."4 The guidelines also seem to ignore congressional policy
concerns underlying section seven of the Clayton Act, and focus exclu31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id at 11,494 (statement of former Representative Carrol.)
Id
Id at 11,498 (statement of former Representative Patman.)
Id
Id at 11,489 (statement of former Representative Keating.)
Id. at 11,486 (statement of former Representative Celler.)
Id
H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949). A vertical merger is one between firms
up and down the supply chain, such as between a firm and its supplier. A horizontal merger
is one between competing firms in the same industry. A conglomerate merger is one between
firms in unrelated industries.
39. The 1982 Guidelines therefore effectively abrogate the distinction between vertical and conglomerate mergers, lumping them both into the non-horizontal category.
40. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § IV.
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sively on economic analysis. This guideline policy is incorporated in a
footnote stating "[a]s a general matter, the Department views the incorporation of non-competitive concerns into antitrust analysis as inconsistent with the mandate contained in the antitrust laws.'
Clearly, the
merger guidelines differ from the congressional policy set forth in the
legislative history of the Clayton Act. Thus the practical implications
of these theories must be analyzed. In reviewing the practical applications, it is important to remember these basic policies which provide a
foundation for concrete antitrust enforcement.
ANALYSIS OF THE 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES
The Guidelines Approach
The guidelines "unifying theme . . .is that mergers should not be
permitted to create or enhance 'market power' or to facilitate its exercise."'4 2 Given this market-oriented approach, the guidelines evaluate a
merger's anticompetitive effects in a three-step process. First, they define the relevant geographical and product markets.4 3 Second, they
rely upon an economic index, called the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,
to measure a market's concentration." Finally, the guidelines evaluate
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and other economic criteria to determine whether or not the merger is objectionable. 45 The following analysis addresses each step in detail.
Defining The Relevant Product and Geographic Markets
In the first phase,4 6 the guidelines define the relevant product markets by "seek[ing] to identify a group of products such that a hypothetical firm that was the only present and future seller of those products
could raise price profitably. '47 The guidelines therefore assume that
one firm has a monopoly on the product such that buyers could only
respond to a price increase by buying other products rather than shifting to another seller of the same product. If the alternative products
were sufficiently attractive to enough buyers so that an attempt by the
monopolist to raise prices would be unprofitable, the market would be
defined too narrowly.4" Under the present guidelines those alternative
products which attracted the customers would be included in the relevant product market.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

47.
48.

Id § V(B) n.54.
Id §1.
Id § II.
Id § III(A).
Id § III(A)(I).
The guidelines take a highly theoretical view towards defining both the relevant product and
geographic markets. This approach leads, generally, to a rather broad market. A broader
market definition leads to fewer antitrust challenges, because the impact of any one merger is
less on the broader market than it would be on a more narrowly defined market.
GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § If(A).
Id
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To achieve this relevant product market, the guidelines begin with
the merging firm's product,4 9 and then add "those products that the
merging firm's customers view as good substitutes at prevailing
prices."5 These two product groups establish a provisional or conditional market.5 The market is conditional, because existing supply
and demand patterns would change if prices were increased. To measure the change in supply and demand patterns, the guidelines inject a
five percent price increase as a "dynamic element"5 2 and then ask how
many buyers would be likely to shift to alternative products within one
year.5 3 If, as previously discussed,5 4 the shift by buyers to other products precludes a profitable price increase the provisional market was
too narrowly defined and the alternative products should be included
in the relevant product market.
Determination of the relevant product markets are, of course, theoretical. In determining whether customers would shift to alternative
products, the guidelines particularly weight buyers' perceptions of the
product's substitutability,5 5 customary usage of the product by the ultimate consumer, its design and physical composition, and similarities or
differences in the price movements of products over the years. 5 6 Establishing the relevant product market substantially narrows the scope of
inquiry. Only those firms producing the relevant product are considered in the guidelines' antitrust analysis.
Determining which firms can be said to produce the relevant product is the next area of inquiry. Here the guidelines focus primarily on
"firms that currently produce and sell the relevant product. ' 57 The
guidelines do, however, consider three additional supply sources. First,
the guidelines consider the price elasticity of supply by use of the production substitution theory.5" Under this theory, the guidelines hypothesize a five percent price increase and then calculate the number of
firms that would change to production and sale of the relevant product
within six months.5 9 Those firms shifting production to include the relevant product are added to the market. The guidelines also recognize
Id The process of defining the relevant product market is repeated for each product of each
merging firm.
50. Id.
51. Id
52. Id § II(A) n.10.
49.

53.

GUIDELINES, supra note 1,§ II(A).

See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
The product's substitutability is important because it indicates how likely, or unlikely, a consumer is to shift from product A to substitute product B. If consumers are generally unwilling to shift to the substitute, the product market has probably been adequately defined. If
the consumers are unwilling to shift to the substitute, however, that substitute should probably be included in the product market.
56. Similarities in the price movement of two products over a period of time indicates a higher
degree of substitutability. Dissimilar price movements, conversely, indicate a lesser degree
of substitutability.
57. GUIDELINES, supra note 1,§ II(B).
58. Id § II(B)(I).
59. Id
54.
55.
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that certain durable products may be recycled or reconditioned to act
as substitutes for the relevant product.6 0 To the extent these products
exist, the firms which produce them are added to the market. 6 1 Finally,
the guidelines recognize that certain vertically integrated firms may
produce the relevant product for internal consumption. Because these
firms are free to buy or sell in the market, they pay an opportunity cost
for those goods used rather than sold; accordingly, the guidelines include in the market the facilities used to produce the relevant
product.62
After the product market is established the guidelines define a geographic market. This market establishes a "geographic boundary that
roughly separates firms that are important factors in the competitive
analysis of a merger from those that are not."' 63 To determine which
firms are important competitors, the guidelines employ an approach
similar to the one used in defining the produce market. The guidelines
assume that one firm has a monopoly on the relevant product within a
given geographic area, so that customers could respond to price increases only by shifting their purchases to producers outside the geographic area, rather than to other producers within the same area.' If
the hypothetical monopolist could not raise prices profitably, the geographic market has been too narrowly defined.65
The guidelines' procedure for defining the geographic market begins with identifying the merging firm's location and establishing a provisional geographic market based on the shipping patterns of the firm
and its closest competitors. 66 The guidelines then interject a price increase just as for the product market calculation 67 hypothesizing a five
percent increase for one year and determining how many firms outside
the provisional market would, given that price increase, be able to profitably expand their sales territories to include the provisional geographic market.6 8 If enough new sellers would move into the
provisional geographic market so that the hypothetical monopolist
could not profitably raise prices, these "new sellers" would be added to
the provisional market. Again, this determination is entirely
hypothetical.
Additionally, the guidelines set forth factors used to assess geographic substitutability including: evidence of prior shifts by buyers
from one seller to another, costs of transport into the geographic market, excess capacity of firms outside the provisional market, costs of
60.

Id § II(B)(2).

61.

Id

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id § II(B)(3).
Id § 11(C).
Id
Id
Id
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.

68.

GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § II(C).

The 1982 Merger Guidelines
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local distribution, and similarities or differences in price movements of
relative products in different geographic regions in the past.69 With the
product and geographic markets defined, the guidelines then analyze a
merger's impact on the market.
Measuring Market Concentration
As previously stated, the guidelines focus primarily on the market
power derived from market concentration. Logically, therefore, the
second step to determining market power is to measure the degree of
market concentration. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is the
indicator used to measure a merger's impact on the market.70 The HHI
is calculated by squaring the market shares of the firms deemed to be
included in the market. 7' Once a proposed merger's HHI is calculated,
the guidelines compare it to the spectrum of market concentrations described below.
In analyzing the HHI, the guidelines consider first the post-merger
perspective, that is, the probable HHI after the merger has occurred.72
The guidelines then divide the spectrums of market concentration, as
measured by the HHI, into three regions which can be characterized as
unconcentrated, moderately concentrated, and highly concentrated.7 3
A post-merger HHI below 1,0007 indicates an unconcentrated market.
The Justice Department is very unlikely to challenge mergers in this
range.75 If the postmerger HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800, the guidelines state that "generalization is particularly difficult."' 76 Here, the
guidelines examine the change in pre-and post-merger HHI levels. The
Justice Department is unlikely to challenge a merger producing a
change of less than 100 points.7 7 On the other hand, the Department is
more likely than not to challenge a merger producing an HHI increase
79
in excess of 100 points.7 8 When the post-merger HHI exceeds 1,800,
the Department will "resolve all questions in favor of challenging the
merger." 80 Nevertheless, the Justice Department will look to the
change in HHI and will be unlikely to challenge mergers causing an
increase of less than fifty points. It will, however, be likely to challenge
69.
70.

Id
Id

71.

Assume, for example, that the market consists of five firms each with a 20% market share.
The HHI would equal 2,000 (202 + 202 + 202 + 202 + 202). The HHI ranges from near 0 (if
the market is atomistic) to 10,000 (in a pure monopoly).

72.

GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § III(A)(1).

§ III(A).

73. Id
74.

This result would occur, for example, where there were 10 firms of equal size.

75.

GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § III(A)(1)(a).

76.

Id

77.
78.
79.

Mergers causing a 100 point increase would occur for example, between firms with market
shares of 25% and 2%, 16% and 3%, 12% and 4%, and 10% and 5%, 8% and 6%, and 7% and
7%.
GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § III(A)(l)(c).
This would result, for example, where there were six equally sized firms.

80.

GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at § III(A)(I)(c).

§ III(A)(l)(b).
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a merger causing an increase exceeding 100 points. 8 ' For mergers causing a fifty to 100 point increase the Justice Department will assess ease
of entry into the market and other factors it feels reliably indicate a
merger's probable impact.8 2
The ease of entry concept is simply an extension of the product substitution theory discussed earlier.8 3 While production substitution asks
how many producers will shift current capacity to produce and sell a
particular product because of a price increase, ease of entry determines
how many producers will expand significantly or construct new facilities to produce a particular product.8 4 Accordingly, the guidelines hypothesize a five percent price increase for a two year period and ask
how many producers will expand or construct facilities to produce the
relevant produce.85 The Justice Department is unlikely to challenge
mergers where "entry into a market is so easy that existing competitors
86
could not succeed in raising prices for any significant period of time."
In addition to ease of entry, the guidelines weigh other factors in
evaluating mergers with a post-merger HHI over 1800 but with a
change of fifty to 100 points. The "other factors" considered in the
guidelines are classified into four general categories.8 7 The first category involves the nature of the product and terms of sale.8 8 Here, the
guidelines consider the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the relevant
product, 9 and the degree of difference between the relevant product
and its next-best substitute. 90
They also consider the geographic market to determine whether the
next-most-distant seller is only slightly or significantly further away
than the last seller included in the geographic market. 9 ' Finally, this
area analyzes the degree of similarity or difference in both the relevant
products and the firms included in the geographic market. The greater
the similarity of products and sellers, the more likely the merger is to be
challenged.9 2
The second category of other factors addresses the flow of informa93
tion about specific transactions and the buyer market characteristics.
Regarding information flow, the guidelines note that collusive agreements which stifle competition "are more likely to persist if participating firms can quickly detect and retaliate against deviations from the
81. Id
82. Id
83. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
84.

GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § III(B).

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

hd
Id
Id § III(C).
Id § III(C)(1).
See discussion, supra page 10, on defining the relevant product and geographic markets.

90.

GUIDELINES, supra note I, § III(C)(1), (2).

91.
92.
93.

Id § III(C)(2).
ld § III(C)(3).
ld § III(C)(2).
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agreed prices or other conditions. '9 4 Thus, the greater the flow of information between the firms, the greater the chance of effective collusion and therefore the greater the chance of Justice Department
intervention. Additionally, the guidelines in this second category, examine the buyer market characteristics. The guidelines hypothesize
that if orders for the relevant product are frequent, regular, and small,
collusion is more likely to "succeed because the benefits of departing
from the collusive agreement in any single transaction are likely to be
small relative to potential costs." 95 Thus, the Justice Department is
more likely to challenge mergers where the buyer market has those
characteristics.
The final two categories of "other factors" take a somewhat historical perspective of the market. In the third category, the guidelines ask
whether prior instances of collusion exist, whether the firm to be acquired has exercised a competitive influence, and whether industry
prices are standardized.9 6 Finally in the fourth category, the guidelines
evaluate whether the market is currently acting non-competitively. If
so, the merger is more likely to be challenged.9 7
In summary, the guidelines begin by defining the relevant product
and geographic markets. These markets are defined at both current
and hypothetically higher price levels. The guidelines then examine
the concentration within those markets by using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. If the HHI deems the market unconcentrated the Justice
Department will probably not intervene. If the HHI shows a moderate
concentration, the guidelines consider the increase in HHI caused by
the merger. finally, if the market is concentrated, the guidelines consider the change in the level of concentration as well as the ease of
entry and a host of other factors. The following section will consider
judicial perspectives of merger analysis. As the discussion clearly indicates, this judicial view does not always comport with the guideline
view outlined in the foregoing analysis.
The Judicial Perspective
In analyzing mergers, the courts have generally focused their attention on many of the same market indicators that the guidelines present.
The crucial distinction between the two stems from their differing approaches. The guidelines employ a strict quantitative approach, while
the courts place greater emphasis on empirical evidence. This section
will highlight this distinction by examining first the judicial definition
of the relevent markets, and then the judicial method of analyzing
merger impacts.
In defining a product market the courts have generally sought a
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id
Id.
Id § IIl(C)(3)(a), (b), (c).
Id § II1(C)(4).
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market broad enough to represent commercial and economic realities." Therefore, the courts have recognized the need to consider "the
reasonable interchangeability of use the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it."9 9 This approach parallels the guidelines' product substitution theory discussed above. o The
courts have also "not been unaware of the importance of substitutability on the 'production' side ..
."10 Thus, the courts also recognize the guidelines' production substitution theory. 0 2 Finally, like
the guidelines," °3 the courts have considered the importance of price
increases on both supply and demand." n
In the past, the courts have also exhibited similarities with the
guidelines in evaluating geographic markets. Thus, they have recognized that the geographic market includes not only the firm's operations area but areas where customers can turn for substitutes as well. 0I
In addition, the courts have recognized the importance of price increases in the geographic market. 106 This brief judicial overview,
seems to indicate that the guidelines comport quite well with established case law; however, closer analysis indicates that the two approaches differ greatly.
The Supreme Court has remarked that market definition does not
require "scientific precision."' 0 7 Therefore, unlike the guidelines, the
courts have often choosen to narrow the market boundaries. The judicial approach asserts that while substitutes exist for every product "a
08
relevant market cannot meaningfully encompass that infinite range."
Thus, the Seventh Circuit has held that the "relevant market need not
be extended to include all products that are reasonably interchageable
in their end-use." 0 9 Furthermore, the courts recognize that within
product markets, "well-defined sub-markets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes.' '
When
these sub-markets exist the courts must evaluate each one individually.
If the merger substantially lessens competition in any one sub-market,
it must be proscribed. 1
The courts have also emphatically denounced strict quantitative
definitions of the geographical market. The Supreme Court has specifically noted that defining the geographic market does not require "de98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.

See, e.g., United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 452 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
Equifax Inc. v. F.T.C., 618 F.2d 63, 66 (9th Cir. 1980).
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
United States v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours and Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956).
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 400 (1956).
United States v. Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
United States v. Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 669 (1974).
United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 452 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. v. F.T.C., 652 F.2d 1324, 1330 (7th Cir. 1981).
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
Id
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lineation of a 'section of the country' by metes and bounds as a
surveyor would lay off a plot of ground."' " 12 The concept of sub-markets is also applied in the geographic area." 3 Thus the courts do not
necessarily expand the geographic market to its theorotical limits as the
guidelines do. While the distinctions between the guidelines and the
case law approach appear significant in defining the relevant markets,
they are even more striking in analyzing a merger's impact.
As earlier discussed, the guidelines analyze a merger's impact primarily by examining market shares and concentration. The guidelines
determine these concentration levels by applying the HerfindahlHirschman Index to a static scale labeling the markets as unconcentrated, slightly concentrated, or highly concentrated classes depending
upon the HHI level. The guidelines will consider other factors, but
only if the HHI is in the highly concentrated range.
The courts take a dramatically different posture. In Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States," 4 the court noted that "while providing no definite
quantitative or qualitative tests by which enforcement agencies could
gauge the effects of a given merger. . . Congress indicated plainly that
a merger had to be functionally viewed, in the context of a particular
The court then went on to recognize that each industry is
industry."'
"almost inevitably unique in every case.""' 6 Because of this uniqueness, the Court continued, "only a further examination of the particular
market-its structure, history and probable future--can provide the
appropriate setting for judging the probable anticompetitive effect of
the merger."'' 7 Thus, the courts consider a myriad of non-economic
factors in merger evaluation. Those factors include: the history of the
individual firm and the industry as a whole, ease of entry, barriers to
entry, the merger's purpose, the industry-wide technology level, price
competitiveness, and consumption patterns, among others." 8 The
guidelines' approach completely lacks this type of functional analysis,
choosing instead to analyze all mergers in a quantitative vacuum.
Perhaps even more importantly, the courts have always paid particular attention to market concentration trends. This trend analysis furthers the congressional intent to arrest monopolies in their
incipiency."' The following section demonstrates this trend analysis,
and illustrates the practical differences between the guidelines and judicial precedent.
112. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549 (1966).
113. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 455.
114. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
115. Id at 321.
116. Id at 322 n. 38.
117. Id
118. See generally Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294; GeneralDynamics Corps., 415 U.S. 486; Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321.
119. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 317.
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A Study in Contrast-The Guidelines and Case Law
A comparative study of two cases will illustrate the significant differences between the judicial and the guidelines approach. In United
States v. Von's Grocery Co. ,120 Von's, a grocery chain, horizontally
merged with Shopping Bag Food Stores. Before the merger Von's
ranked third, with a 4.7% market share, and Shopping Bag sixth, with a
4.2% market share in the Los Angeles area retail market.' 2' The largest
single firm had an 8% share: the four leading firms had a combined
share of 24.4%, the eight leading firms a combined total of 40.9%, and
the twelve leading firms a combined total of 48.8%. 122 Under the
guidelines, the HHI would barely approach
500123 and, therefore, the
24
merger would have gone unchallanged.'
The Court, however, took quite a different approach. Noting that
"[tihe facts of this case present exactly the threatening trend toward
concentration which Congress wanted to halt,"'' 25 the court enjoined
the merger. Von's argued that the market was competitive before the
merger, and continued to be competitive afterwards. Nonetheless the
Court emphasized that a growing number of mergers in a market could
slowly but inevitably destroy competition. The Court added that the
Celler-Kefauver amendment 2was
passed specifically "to prevent such a
6
destruction of competition."
UnitedStates v. InternationalHarvesterCo. presents a converse situation. 27 In Harvester, two farm tractor manufacturers merged in an
industry with an HHI near the highly concentrated 1,800 level."2 8 The
merging firms accounted for a 14% and 8% market share respectively, 129 and the merger, therefore, increased the HHI by 204 points. 3 0
The guidelines clearly would mandate a challenge to this merger. In
this case, however, the Seventh Circuit found that because one firm was
a weak competitor "the market-share statistics gave an inaccurate account of the acquisition's probable effects on competition.''
These two cases illustrate the inherent inflexibility of a strict quanti120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

384 U.S. 270 (1966).
Id
Id at 281 (White, J., dissenting).
Because complete market shares were not provided for each firm, it is impossible to calculate
the exact HHI. Even assuming the highest concentration levels, however, the HHI would be
less than 500.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. at 277.
Id at 278. See supra note 25 and accompanying text, for discussion of the legislative purpose
of the Clayton Act.
564 F.2d 769, 771 (7th Cir. 1977).
Because of the case's facts, an exact determination cannot be achieved. In this case the top
four producers accounted for 73% of the market.
International Harvester, 564 F.2d at 771.
Prior to the merger, each firm would contribute its own share to the HHI. Thus, the two
firms contributed 142 + 82 or 280 points. After the merger the firms contributed 222 or 484
points.
International Harvester, 564 F.2d at 773 (1977) (citing United States v. Citizens and Southern
National Bank, 422 U.S. at 120).
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tative approach to merger analysis. Such an analysis eschews the functional approach established in Brown Shoe. 1 32 As a result, the
guidelines may reach results which comport with neither case law nor
economic reality.
EMPIRICAL EFFECTS
A review of the Court's treatment of the guidelines' helps highlight
the problems caused by the growing number of mergers coupled with
growing confusion in the law interpreting Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
While the courts often cited the previous guidelines as secondary authority, they have paid the current guidelines little deference. This
treatment calls into question the guidelines' validity. Two recent cases
illustrate this point.
In United States v. Virginia NationalBankshares, Inc. ,' a federal
district court exhibited its reluctance to accept the guidelines' theoretical market definition approach. In this case, the Justice Department
brought a Section 7 cause of action and attempted to use the guidelines
to establish the relevant geographic market.' 34 The Department alleged that two banks were horizontal competitors despite the fact that
they were eight miles apart and separated by a mountain. 3 ' The defendants countered with testimony by local businessmen that the two
banks were really in seperate geographic markets. 136 The court held
for the defendant, noting:
that what the government has here is speculative based on what might
happen as distinguished from the real world which has been testified
by the bankers in this case who are down at the grass roots and know
what's going on . . .this Court [would] be utterly foolish to go off
chasing rainbows, and the government has not borne the burden of
proof.r"
The Second Circuit in United States v. American Cyanamid Co. ,"
provided an equally strong denunciation of the guidelines' approach to
vertical mergers. 39 In allowing the merger, the district court stated
that "[c]ontemporary economic theory recognizes that vertical integration may foster corporate efficiency and enhance competition in the
market place.'
On appeal, the court traced the development of the
132.
133.
134.
135.

370 U.S. 294; see supra text accompanying note 115.
1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,871.
Id
Id.

136. Id

137. Id
138. 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,656 (Oct. 5, 1983).
139. The guidelines have effectively abolished the distinction between vertical mergers and conglomerate mergers, choosing to group the two categories under the broad heading on nonhorizontal mergers. Moreover, the guidelines note that these non-horizontal mergers pose
less of an antitrust threat than do horizontal mergers. See supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
140. 1982-3 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,152 (1983).
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landmark Brown Shoe case. t4 1 In reversing the district court's holding,
the Second Circuit effectively denounced the contemporary economic
theories which form the basis for the guidelines. The court noted that
[w]hile Brown Shoe and its progeny have been the subject of considerable criticism by academicians who believe these cases apply overly
harsh standards in assessing the legality of vertical mergers, these cases
nonetheless continue to constitute the current state of the law as preCourt, which circuit and district courts are
scribed by the Supreme
42
bound to follow.1
While this opinion expressly reaffirms the judiciary's convictions in its
own precedent, it strongly calls into question the guidelines' validity.
Given the Justice Department's role as the pre-eminent plaintiff in Section 7 causes of action, this is extremely problematic, and it is this situation which frames the issues for the following recommendations.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Both administrative and legislative action may be employed to remedy the current merger crisis. Administratively, changes in the merger
guidelines will allow the Justice Department to successfully challenge
more mergers1 4 3 and thus allow for growth in the interpretive body of
case law. Legislative action is also imperative to provide guidance to
the judicial and executive branches, as well as to the business community. The following recommendations recognize the interdependence
.of these administrative and legislative actions in the formulation of a
comprehensive and effective merger policy.
Recommendations for guideline changes focus on the areas of market definition 44 and market concentration analysis.' 4 5 As previously
discussed,'" the guidelines employ a highly theoretical approach to establishing both the relevant product and geographic markets. Specifically, the guidelines consider existing supply and demand patterns but
also attempt to guage the impact of hypothetical price increases on consumer demand for the relevant product, production decisions of other
firms within the existing market, and the marketing decisions of firms
outside the existing geographical market. 47 In short, the guidelines
seek to expand markets to their theoretical limits. In so doing, however, the guidelines ignore such practical implications as geographical
141. 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,656 (Oct. 5, 1983).
142. Id
143. Given the Justice Department's general noninterventionist policy, this position would, at first
blush, seem untenable. Presumably, however, the Department will continue to challenge at
least some mergers. In addition, if the Department would prefer the incorporation of advanced economic theories into merger law, it must propose more moderate changes that the
courts will both accept and understand.
144. GUIDELINES, supra note 1,§ II.
145. Id § III.
146. See, e.g., supra note 47 and accompanying text.
147. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § II(A), (B), (C).
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and product sub-markets 48 and imperfections in marketplace communications. 149 A number of commentators, 150 and more importantly,
the
5
courts have taken issue with this hypothetical approach.' '
An alternative to this hypothetical approach employs emperical evidence to establish the relevant product and geographic markets. In
attempting to ascertain relevant sub-markets, for example, the guidelines might consider the testimony of business people familiar with
both the industry and the particular geographic area. Similarly, the
impact, if any, of price increases may be determined by statistically
sampling relevant producers and consumers to determine their reactions to any increases.
This alternative offers several advantages. First, it simply allows for
more realistic, and hence more effective, analysis. In addition, it would
undoubtedly enjoy wider judicial acceptance, since empirical evidence
indicates' 5 2 that the courts prefer a more factual market definition technique. Finally, such a method may actually be easier to implement' 5 3
than the 1982 merger guidelines.
Changes in the market concentration analysis are also appropriate.
In an effort to provide predictability, the guidelines have oversimplified
merger analysis. As previously discussed, the guidelines employ postmerger HHI to divide the market into three concentration levels.
Under the guidelines, mergers occurring in unconcentrated markets are
extremely unlikely to be challenged.' 54 The decision to challenge
mergers in moderately concentrated markets depends upon the change
in pre- and post-merger HHI, 1 5 while the decision to challenge mergers in the highly concentrated
market depends upon HHI change and
56
other economic factors.'
While such market concentration analysis is useful, it cannot be the
148. See, e.g., supra note 110 and accompanying text.

149. The guidelines assume, for example, that a price increase will be effectively communicated
throughout the market. See, e.g., GUIDELINES, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., R.G. Harris & T.M. Jorde, The 1982 HorizontalMerger Guidelines: Implicationsfor
Antitrust Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 464 (1983). S.M. Litvack, Government Antitrust
Policy. Theory Versus Practiceand the Role of the Antitrust Division, 60 TEX. L. REv. 649
(1982).
151. See United States v. Virginia National Bankshares, Inc., supra note 133 and accompanying
text.
152. Id
153. The guidelines, for example, look at such factors as: "[e]vidence of buyers' perceptions that
the products are or are not substitutes, particularly if those buyers have [previously] shifted
purchases between the products in response to changes in relative price ..
" GUIDELINES,
supra note 1, at § II(A)(1); "[e]vidence of sellers' perceptions that the products are or are not
substitutes, particularly if business decisions have been based on those perceptions." Id at
§ II(A)(4); and "[e]vidence of buyers actually having shifted their purchases among sellers at
different geographical locations, especially if the shifts corresponded to changes in relative
price.
... Id at § II(C)(1). Because the guidelines already look at such detailed empirical
evidence, interviews with relevant members of the business community or a statistical sampling would not seem too difficult to accomplish.
154. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § II(A)(l)(a).
155. Id
156. Id

§ II(A)(l)(b).
§ II(A)(1)(c).
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sole or even the primary factor in merger analysis. Such a one-dimensional analysis does not comport with either case law or the legislative
history of the Clayton Act. 1 57 An alternative is to employ trend analysis and noneconomic factors at all levels of market concentration.
Trend analysis' 5 8 helps implement the espoused legislative intent of
preventN monopolies in their incipiency. It is also used in a number
The consideration of noneconomic factors helps lend a cerof cases.'
tain pragmatic sense to an otherwise theoretical analysis. Additionally,
these noneconomic factors would help promote the policy goals discussed so extensively in the legislative history. Finally, the general
classifications into unconcentrated, moderately concentrated, and
highly concentrated markets should be retained to assist the business
community in merger decisionmaking. The classifications should,
however, be considered along with the other factors mentioned.
The aforementioned recommendations seek to find a realistic middle ground. Such recommendations should appeal to both the Justice
Department and the courts. These recommendations would afford the
desired growth in interpretive law and provide a framework for future
changes in the guidelines to react to the changing needs of contemporary society.
Legislation may provide both short- and long-term solutions to the
current merger problems. Short-term legislation, focusing upon the immediate problems in a particular industry, allows Congress to adapt
swiftly to significant market changes. House bill 5042, referred to as
the Domestic Petroleum Company Acquisition Act of 1984,16o provides
an excellent illustration of such legislation. This bill sought to place a
moratorium on large oil company mergers 16 ' in response to the merger
wave which swept the petroleum industry in 1984.162 Legislation of
this type is particularly useful in an economy increasingly dominated
by high-tech industries. Rapid technological developments in these industries provide an environment in which the combination of firms
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914)(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982)).
Such an analysis would consider recent industry trends toward, or away from, concentration.
See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294; Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270.
H.R. 5042, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H1339 (daily ed. March 6, 1984). See also
S. 2277, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S 1179 (daily ed. February 8, 1984).
161. Specifically, the Act would "prohibit major oil companies [which produce more than an
average of 500,000 barrels of crude oil per day] from acquiring control of other major oil
companies or mid-sized domestic energy concerns [those producing more than an average of
50,000 barrels of crude oil per day.]" 130 CONG. REc. E805 (daily ed. March 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. J. Seiberling, D-Ohio). Such legislation is particularly useful because it maintains the status quo and thus affords Congress the opportunity to examine the problem at
greater length.
162. See discussion supra note 13. After more than eight hours of debate over two days, the
Senate voted to reject the Act. As an alternative, the Senate adopted a measure calling for
the finance, judiciary, and energy committees to study the antitrust, tax, and social implications of the recent petroleum industry merger wave. These committees are to make recommendations by July 1, 1984. R.D. Hershey, Senate Rejects Curb on Oil Mergers, N.Y. Times,
March 29, 1984, at 29, col. 2.
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with even a small percentage of the market can rapidly lead to antitrust
problems.
While this short-term legislation is certainly beneficial, it is imperative that Congress take up the broader issue of a comprehensive longterm merger policy. From this long-term perspective Congress must
address several issues. First, any legislation should reexamine and
reevaluate the basic policies behind Section 7 of the Clayton Act considering those policies in light of the current economic conditions. Accordingly, Congress must weigh the benefits of preventing excessive
economic concentration and fostering small business growth against
the benefits, if any, which result from corporate growth.
In addition, long-term legislation would ideally provide current and
future regulators with a focus. As discussed throughout this note, the
current Justice Department has opted for an exclusively economic analytical approach foregoing any consideration of the social values embodied in the Clayton Act's legislative history. By forthrightly
addressing the validity of this analysis, Congress will provide guidance
for future interpretation of the Act.
Long-term legislation must also discuss the basic merger categories.
Specifically, Congress must decide whether to retain the traditional
horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate categories or to accept the
merger guidelines' horizontal non-horizontal dichotomy. This is important because of the current difference of opinion between the courts
and the guidelines.
Finally, it is important that any new legislation be drafted broadly
enough to be flexible. Such flexibility is essential as America faces an
increasingly more complex international economic environment. By
combining this flexible long-term policy with specifically-targeted
short-term legislation and appropriate revisions in the merger guidelines, Congress can achieve a comprehensive and effective merger
policy.
CONCLUSION
The United States faces an economic policy crisis. Mergers continue to grow in both size and number while the laws governing them
have become ineffective. Reform is needed on both the legislative and
administrative levels. Such reform entails both short- and long-term
legislation, as well as revisions in the Justice Department's merger
guidelines. Failure to act on these issues will undoubtedly result in
continued economic concentration which seriously jeopardizes the policies embodied in antitrust law. Congress and the present administra-
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tion have the power to eliminate the current crisis and to establish an
effective and comprehensive merger policy.
Steven M Surdell*
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